

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe

Volume 7

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Contents

Preface	IX
The Editors	XV
Editorial Advisers	XVII
List of Technical Terms	XVIII

Islams in Europe: Satellites or a Universe Apart?	1
<i>Jonathan Laurence</i>	

Country Surveys

Albania	13
<i>Olsi Jazexhi</i>	
Armenia	33
<i>Sevak Karamyan</i>	
Austria	41
<i>Kerem Öktem</i>	
Azerbaijan	62
<i>Altay Goyushov</i>	
Belarus	79
<i>Daša Štabčanka</i>	
Belgium	87
<i>Jean-François Husson</i>	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	114
<i>Aid Smajić and Muhamed Fazlović</i>	
Bulgaria	130
<i>Aziz Nazmi Shakir</i>	
Croatia	145
<i>Dino Mujadžević</i>	

- Cyprus** 157
Ali Dayioğlu and Mete Hatay
- Czech Republic** 174
Štěpán Macháček
- Denmark** 182
Brian Arly Jacobsen
- Estonia** 201
Ringo Ringvee
- Finland** 209
Teemu Pauha
- France** 226
Anne-Laure Zwilling
- Georgia** 247
Thomas Liles and Bayram Balci
- Germany** 272
Mathias Rohe
- Greece** 289
Konstantinos Tsitselikis and Alexandros Sakellariou
- Hungary** 302
Eszteella Csiszár
- Iceland** 314
Kristján Þór Sigurðsson
- Ireland** 321
Colette Colfer
- Italy** 337
Stella Coglievina
- Kosovo** 353
Driton Morina

- Latvia** 364
Simona Gurbo
- Lithuania** 370
Egdūnas Račius
- Luxembourg** 378
Elsa Pirenne and Lucie Waltzer
- Malta** 391
Martin R. Zammit
- Moldova** 397
Aurelia Felea
- Montenegro** 407
Sabina Pačariz
- Netherlands** 421
Martijn de Koning
- Norway** 436
Sindre Bangstad and Olav Elgvin
- Poland** 450
Agata S. Nalborczyk
- Portugal** 465
José Mapril
- Romania** 474
Irina Vainovski-Mihai
- Russia** 486
Elmira Akhmetova
- Serbia** 503
Ivan Ejub Kostić
- Slovakia** 515
Jaroslav Drobny

Slovenia 523

Christian Moe

Spain 534

Jordi Moreras

Sweden 549

Göran Larsson

Switzerland 562

Mallory Schneuwly Purdie and Andreas Tunger-Zanetti

Turkey 579

İştar Gözaydın

Ukraine 592

Mykhaylo Yakubovych

United Kingdom 607

Asma Mustafa

United Kingdom

Asma Mustafa

Introduction

While 2014 proved to be a challenging year for British Muslims in public life, with their religious identity and loyalty to Britain being continually questioned, it also proved to be a constructive year of civic engagement, social activism and challenging the status quo. Religious identity continued to be a significant matter in 2014. Public opinion poll data was released that underlined the antagonism towards Muslims across Europe. A report from the Pew Research Centre¹ conducted in the spring of 2014 across several European countries found that negative British attitudes towards Muslims measured 26%, which is relatively low when compared to other European countries (63% in Italy, 53% in Greece and 50% in Poland).

Public Debates

“Operation Trojan Horse” was in the news headlines in 2014, referring to alleged attempts by Muslim parents to take control of the governance of some state schools in Birmingham and to enforce strict Muslim values. The story began with a letter leaked to the media (generally agreed to be a forgery) which led to various City Council staff, school staff members and parents contacting media outlets with statements and examples regarding a perceived Islamisation of certain primary schools with the majority of pupils being from a Muslim background: this included the call to prayer being recited aloud in the school, the reinforcement of Muslim identity to the exclusion or disparagement of other identities, and the introduction of conservative Islamic practices into school life.

Michael Gove (Secretary of State for Education at the time) ordered the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) to

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1 Pew Research Centre, “A fragile rebound for EU image on eve of European Parliament elections”, 12 May 2014, p. 31, www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/2014-05-12_Pew-Global-Attitudes-European-Union.pdf, accessed 10 January 2015.

probe the case, and 21 schools in Birmingham were investigated in March 2014. This subsequently led to further Ofsted investigations across the country. Peter Clarke was tasked with investigating the Trojan Horse incident and commissioned a full report detailing the history and cases, including recommendations.² The result of weeks of media analysis of the Trojan Horse case led Muslims involved in the cases to vociferously deny underhanded tactics. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was criticised in Clarke's investigation, but denied any wrongdoing and questioned why it had not been approached by the investigating team with the opportunity to discuss or provide a rebuttal to the accusations made against it.³ The Trojan Horse affair had damaged trust and community cohesion in Birmingham, a city known for its multicultural heritage and interfaith relationships, and it has once again placed emphasis on "suspicious" Muslim parents, Muslim school governors, and alienated Muslim students. However, the affair has also resulted in uncovering wrong managerial practices, poor teacher training, and a deficit of educational leadership in those schools.

Another serious backlash occurred early in 2014. The halal meat debacle began with the acknowledgement from many supermarkets and food outlets that they had been serving halal meat without labelling it as such. This triggered a negative reaction of the public, as this news followed on from the horse meat scandal the year before, where foods marketed as containing beef were found to contain high amounts of (undeclared) horse meat. The anger was partly motivated by animal welfare concerns (that animals are slaughtered without being stunned ahead of slaughter). In actual fact, 84% of cattle/calves halal slaughtered in the UK is "pre-stunned" according to the Food Standards Agency,⁴ while 81% of sheep and 88% of poultry were pre-stunned ahead of halal slaughter. This debate was in most part about multiculturalism. It was about British people who are not of Muslim faith respecting the right of others to religious methods of meat production, while they themselves were misled

2 http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/20549/1/Report_into_allegations_concerning_Birmingham_schools_arising_from_the_Trojan_Horse_letter-web.pdf, accessed 10 January 2015.

3 www.mcb.org.uk/the-muslim-council-of-britain-responds-to-peter-clarkes-trojan-horse-letter-report/, accessed 10 January 2015.

4 According to the FSA 2011 Animal Welfare Survey in Great Britain, 84% of halal cattle/calves were stunned before slaughter, and less than 1% stunned after bleeding; 81% of halal sheep and goats were stunned before slaughter and less than 1% stunned after bleeding; 88% of poultry was stunned before slaughter, www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdfs/board/fsa120508.pdf, accessed 10 January 2015.

into the purveying, purchasing or partaking of that meat due to lack of clear labelling.

While Muslims continued to have their patriotism scrutinised and debated in 2014, this year also included several optimistic newsworthy stories. *The Sun* newspaper hosted its first “positive” front cover image of a Muslim female wearing a Union Jack head scarf,⁵ the article below it urging all British people to stand against so-called Islamic State (ISIS). The patriotic headscarf was another story in 2014, when the design and sale of a “poppy head scarf” was launched in October, supported by the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) and British Future.⁶ It was designed by a British female Muslim designer, Tabinda-Kauser Ishaq, to encourage a new method of marking Remembrance Day for British Muslim females (though technically, the scarf could be purchased and worn by anyone regardless of faith or gender). The wearing of a red poppy on one’s clothing is the normal form of commemorating British lives lost in previous wars. The addition of the poppy scarf was welcomed by some British Muslims⁷ as a positive step in engaging with wider society on an issue that is highly respected and forms part of British history and its social landscape. It was, however, not well received by other British Muslims as the poppy scarf was seen as a marketing strategy—the hijab is in essence a devotional religious duty for females, and the poppy scarf was critiqued as an advert for patriotic identification. The poppy scarf was perceived as a further example of Muslims being pressured to explicitly demonstrate their belonging and conform to the norms of national identity.⁸ The publicity the fashionable item received ensured it was sold out.

2014 saw several non-political discussions that have impacted on and been debated among British Muslims. Some of the debates were relatively innocuous: such as the discussion over the production of a British Muslim “Happy” video (and yet another addition among many playing homage to the original “Happy” video by musician Pharrell Williams).⁹ The video was produced and released by the Honesty Policy (a group of anonymous Islamic activists), in

5 www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/5978853/The-Sun-urges-ALL-Brits-to-unite-against-Islamic-State-extremists.html, accessed 13 January 2015.

6 www.britishfuture.org/articles/news/poppy-headscarf-centenary-victoria-cross-muslim-soldier/, accessed 13 January 2015.

7 www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/11/06/poppy-hijab-asim-hafiz_n_6115432.html; www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-29833296, all accessed 8 January 2015.

8 <http://mediadiversified.org/2014/11/05/why-i-wont-be-wearing-the-poppy-hijab/>; www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/11/split-uk-opinion-over-poppy-hijabs-20141196523894487.html; <http://5pillarsuk.com/2014/10/30/british-muslims-urged-to-wear-poppy-hijab/>, all accessed 10 January 2015.

9 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gVDIXqILqSM>, accessed 26 May 2015.

which diverse Muslims—some of them public figures—dance, clap and jump around to the chirpy and addictive tune. There was a considerable outcry, as expected, from more conservative quarters,¹⁰ deeming the video socially subversive, religiously prohibited, and following a British cultural assimilation agenda.

Far right parties were relatively quiet in 2014 with respect to Muslims, given the decline of the EDL (English Defence League) and the BNP (British National Party). A new movement called Britain First had been forged in 2011 by former members of the BNP, campaigning against what they perceive as the Islamisation of the UK. Britain First members entered several mosques in a threatening way in the spring of 2014,¹¹ handing out Bibles and leaflets in an attempt to mimic a Christian crusade and to underline their patriotic vigilance. No backlash occurred, and it was seen as a mild attempt to whip up anger among Muslims, with little effect.

Muslims living in Northern Ireland faced an offensive incident in 2014 when Pastor James McConnell (a born-again Christian) preached in a sermon that Islam was evil and satanic. This incident occurred in a Belfast church which the First Minister Peter Robinson occasionally attends. Initially, the First Minister and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party refused to denounce the comments made by the preacher. The First Minister instead stated he did not trust Muslims who observe shari'a law—though a Muslim going to the shop for him may be relied upon.¹² The First Minister later argued that his comments were misinterpreted, apologised for his remarks and any offense caused, and also visited the Belfast Islamic Centre. Several criminal incidents linked to this incident occurred—two Muslim men were assaulted and attacked in their homes in Belfast, one was hospitalised due to his injuries.

10 www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/04/16/british-muslims-dance-to-happy_n_5158270.html; www.economist.com/news/britain/21601544-online-video-sparks-heated-debate-happy-or-haram; www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/features/sinful-video-of-british-muslims-dancing-to-pharrell-williams-hit-happy-comes-under-attack-9268418.html; www.theguardian.com/music/shortcuts/2014/apr/18/happy-british-muslims-video-pharrell-williams, all accessed 10 January 2015.

11 www.channel4.com/news/britain-first-far-right-anti-muslim-extremists-mosques; www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27427023, both accessed 10 May 2015.

12 www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/03/peter-robinson-northern-ireland-muslims-apology-preacher; www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/31/peter-robinson-called-to-issue-public-apology-for-insulting-muslims; www.economist.com/news/britain/21604192-they-do-things-differently-northern-irelandincluding-muslim-bashing-other-foot, all accessed 10 January 2015.

Transnational Links

The discussion surrounding British Muslim citizens travelling to the Middle East to join various warring factions (whether ISIS, anti-Asad forces or Kurdish forces fighting ISIS)¹³ had reached fever pitch in 2014—the estimated number of people joining ISIS or other groups reached 500, but may be more.¹⁴ The numbers do not only include fighters, but also women who have travelled abroad with the aim of settling in and not returning¹⁵ including Glaswegian Aqsa Mahmood, aged 20, and twins Zahra and Salma Halane, aged 16, from Manchester. The first British citizen to be convicted under terror laws for attempting to fund jihadi fighters in Syria was Amal El Wahabi from London, who attempted to pay her friend Nawal Msaad to smuggle £15,000 from Heathrow to Turkey.¹⁶

The horrific murders of British captives David Haines and Alan Henning by ISIS drew increased attention for beheading videos because of being posted via social media. The distress of the murders was also perceived as additionally shocking because the beheadings were apparently conducted by an individual who appears to speak with an English accent.¹⁷ The murder of Alan Henning was especially distressing to many people, including Muslims,¹⁸ because he had been travelling to Syria on a humanitarian mission, giving his time and energy to help people in dire need.¹⁹

13 “UK fighters in Syria ‘not mercenaries’”, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30172856, accessed 10 January 2015.

14 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11164905/Syrian-crisis-British-death-toll.html; www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/21/british-jihadi-killed-syria-kobani-islamic-state-isis; www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27960816, all accessed 10 May 2015.

15 “The British women married to jihad”, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/british-women-married-to-jihad-isis-syria; www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11133324/British-Muslim-girls-Were-sick-to-death-of-these-jihadi-brides-going-to-Syria-its-disgusting.html; www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/islamic-state-david-camerons-head-will-be-on-a-spike-says-british-woman-in-syria-9721757.html, all accessed 10 January 2015.

16 www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/13/amal-el-wahabi-nawal-msaad-trial-syria-terrorism, accessed 10 May 2015.

17 Later identified as Mohammed Emwazi.

18 www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/05/isis-murder-alan-henning-british-muslim-community, accessed 10 May 2015.

19 www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/03/alan-henning-isis-syria-video-murder; www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29485405, accessed 10 January 2015.

The impact of terror networks was unrelenting in 2014, when international suspicion continued in the form of a terror list released by the United Arab Emirates (UAE).²⁰ The list comprised 80 organisations, including groups such as Al-Qaeda, al Nusra Front, Nigeria's Boko Haram, the Taliban and ISIS but surprisingly also included several Western based civic organisations and charities such as Islamic Relief (UK-registered charity that works with the British government), CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations), the most prominent Muslim civil liberties group in the United States, and the Cordoba Foundation in the UK (a think tank, research and public relations organisation).

Law and Domestic Politics

The most powerful legal impact on Muslims in 2014 came in November, when the Home Secretary Theresa May announced a new counter-terrorism bill:

The Bill will give the authorities greater powers to disrupt and control the movements of people who want to travel abroad to fight . . . So the message to British nationals participating in terrorism overseas is clear: you will only be allowed to come home on our terms.²¹

The new legal change will permit the State to seize British passports from those suspected of travelling for the purposes of terrorism. It could also lead to the deportation of immigrants or barring the re-entry of British citizens on their way home if they are suspected of engaging in terror related activity. The bill further states that local authorities, including schools, colleges and universities will be required to counter radicalisation by identifying individuals or cases "vulnerable" to terrorism, and to provide action-oriented support plans (such as social services, health services and so on) to tackle the potential problem before it escalates. At this stage, the definition of "vulnerable to terrorism" is unclear, but the potential for accusations, exaggerations and misunderstandings abound in the social network sphere—stories of children being taken away

20 <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/15/UAE-formally-blacklists-82-groups-as-terrorist-.html>, accessed 10 January 2015.

21 May, Theresa, Transcript of speech on protecting the UK against terrorism, delivered on 24 November 2014 at Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-theresa-may-on-counter-terrorism>, accessed 10 January 2015.

from parents, teachers threatening to report students as a form of discipline and the diminishing effect it could have on the behaviour of outwardly observing Muslims are some of the many debates and discussions this bill has led to.²²

In August 2014, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi announced her resignation as a Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. She resigned in protest at the Government's response to the crisis in Gaza. Baroness Warsi was the first Muslim female in the British Cabinet. She also held significant roles as Senior Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as holding the portfolio of Minister for Faith and Communities at the Department for Communities and Local Government. In her resignation letter to the Prime Minister, Baroness Warsi wrote:

My view has been that our policy in relation to the Middle East Peace Process generally but more recently our approach and language during the current crisis in Gaza is morally indefensible, is not in Britain's national interest and will have a long term detrimental impact on our reputation internationally and domestically.²³

Her resignation led to a debate over the lack of condemnation from the British government over the Israeli bombardment of Gaza and a deeper exploration (at least in the short term) over a moral decision to resign from a political post. YouGov polled 1,943 adults for the Sunday Times²⁴ and 44% of those polled agreed that Baroness Warsi was right to have resigned (with 25% saying she was wrong and 31% undecided).

In an unprecedented move, the bank accounts of Muslim civil activists and organisations were closed in 2014.²⁵ The bank HSBC wrote letters to a number of people including Anas al-Tikriti, and his wife and children, to inform them that their bank accounts were to be closed because they are outside the bank's "risk appetite."²⁶ The lack of detailed explanation for the closure of the bank accounts from HSBC worried many, with no clarity as to why personal accounts

22 www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/24/counter-terrorism-security-bill-proposals-pitfalls; www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11052486/Theresa-May-New-laws-to-tackle-British-jihadists.html, both accessed 10 January 2015.

23 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-28657623, accessed 10 May 2015.

24 http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/s41ippsqgi/YG-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-140808.pdf, accessed 10 January 2015.

25 www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28553921, accessed 10 January 2015.

26 Anas Al-Tikriti is the founder of the Cordoba Foundation, a think tank promoting inter-cultural dialogue.

were targeted and closed. Organisations and charities similarly besieged included the Finsbury Park Mosque, the Cordoba Foundation and the Ummah Welfare Trust. Although the bank argued that this was not for religious reasons, many trustees, activists, and community members questioned the motives behind such unusual actions, especially as these organisations argued they had been exemplar banking customers. The only relationship between all organisations is that they have worked on, in or for Gaza causes, though the most likely explanation is a sudden guarded approach due to more rigorous money laundering and counter-terrorism legislation. In a similar episode earlier in the year, CAGE²⁷ had its bank accounts closed by Barclays and the Co-Operative Bank, but without prior notification.²⁸ Also closed without explanation were the personal accounts of the treasurer and a volunteer.

Activities and Initiatives of Main Muslim Organisations

2014 saw the hosting of another successful national Living Islam Festival by the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) that ran from the 31 July to 3 August at a 200 acre showground in Lincolnshire. Set in the heart of the English countryside, around 4,000 people (mainly families) attended the residential event, with the options of camping or caravanning on site, or staying at local hotels. Young children were entertained by clowns, bouncy castles, craft activities, and animal petting; while older children participate in scouts' activities—competing in sports games, working together in teams, and exploring spiritual concepts.

The circus style Big Top hosted large scale lectures such as that of Dr Rowan Williams (the previous Archbishop of Canterbury) and loud entertainment evenings, after which participants were wowed by a colourful and noisy fireworks display. The daytime seminars varied from the spiritual to the heatedly debated and included topics such as Shakespeare, successful marriage, British values, children's education, gender discrimination, and mental health. Armed Forces personnel were also invited to speak to participants and the sessions were well attended, respectful even if a little impassioned at times.

British Muslim TV was advertised at Living Islam and officially launched in the summer of 2014. British Muslim TV has the slogan "Confidently Muslim,

27 CAGE is an independent advocacy organisation working on those impacted by the War on Terror, www.cageuk.org/, accessed 10 January 2015.

28 www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/06/cage-complaint-bank-accounts-closed, accessed 10 January 2015.

Comfortably British.”²⁹ The channel is transmitted via Sky, with a host of popular or “celebrity” Muslims presenting shows on cooking, politics, popular culture, and children’s entertainment. The programming aims to target a British Muslim audience with a diverse programming agenda:

British Muslim TV is a fresh and exciting TV channel, bursting with a range of educational and entertaining content... Research has shown that the majority of Muslims in Britain embrace their “Britishness” but find that broadcast media rarely caters effectively for their interests. To address this, British Muslim TV packs screens with innovative and original productions, offering viewers a lively mix of live and recorded programmes... Developed by British Muslims for British Muslims, the station aims to appeal to all sections of Muslim society by remaining non-sectarian and open to different views—helping to bring fragmented communities together.³⁰

In an attempt to challenge the other free-to-view Muslim Islam Channel, British Muslim TV aims to focus less on fundraising and religious dialogue, and more on the lives of Muslims growing up, socialising, and engaging as citizens in Britain. 2014 was also the year that celebrated the 25th birthday of Muslim News, an English language newspaper, and the 10th anniversary of Muslim Weekly; both are London-based newspapers with a Muslim readership.

British Muslims continued using modern methods of social engagement to connect with their non-Muslim British counterparts. They are exploring their multifaceted identity in some entertaining and light-hearted ways. Muslims tweeted humorous messages via #MuslimApologies, some wrote ironic apologies for beneficial Islamic historical contributions such as algebra and universities, while others mock-apologised for facial hair, looking great in a head scarf and thanking God in prayer. On a more serious note, Muslim twitter users used the hashtag #NotInMyName to counter the radical rhetoric of ISIS, by denouncing their provocative hate-filled propaganda. Comedic depictions of extremist militants behaving absurdly via YouTube video’s, contradicting the slick, clever and sophisticated image the terrorists would prefer to convey, began to appear as well. This use of humour and social media to counter extremist ideology is a fast and possibly effective way of used by British Muslims to denounce the behaviour of groups such as ISIS.

29 <http://britishmuslim.tv/>, accessed 10 January 2015.

30 <http://britishmuslim.tv/about>, accessed 10 January 2015.

Demographics and Statistics

The most comprehensive and up to date statistics we have on British Muslims is from the 2011 Census.³¹ The population is surveyed every 10 years, and this includes a question on religion. The 2011 England and Wales census results³² show an increase in the number of British people identifying themselves as Muslim from 3% to just under 5%. Muslims make the second largest religious group in England and Wales with 2.7 million. The 2011 census results for Scotland were released in early 2014 and highlighted that Muslims constitute 1.4% of the Scottish population. According to the Northern Ireland Census of 2011, 3,832 Muslims lived in Northern Ireland.³³

Though Muslims are ethnically diverse worldwide, according to the census results, British Muslims are more ethnically concentrated—68% were from a South Asian background, including Pakistani (38%) and Bangladeshi (15%). Muslims who identified themselves as belonging to the “other” ethnic category were 11% (including Arabs, Turks, Iranians and other ethnic groups), while Black/African/Caribbean/Black British made up to 10%. Nearly half of all British Muslims were born in the UK.³⁴ An additional ethnic category in the 2011 England and Wales census was the “Arab” option, which highlighted that Arabs make 0.4% of the population,³⁵ of whom 78% identified themselves as Muslims. Among religious groups, Muslims continue to have the youngest age profile, with nearly half of Muslims (48%) aged under 25 (1.3 million) and 88% aged under 50 (2.4 million).³⁶ The gender divide is very slight, with marginally more men than women (52% to 48%).

31 “What does the Census tell us about religion in 2011?”, www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_310454.pdf. Ali, Sundas, *British Muslims in Numbers* (London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015), www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCB_Census_Report_2015.pdf, all accessed 10 May 2015.

32 Hussain, Serena, and Sherif, Jamil, “Minority Religions in the Census: the Case of British Muslims”, *Religion*, vol. 44, no. 3 (2014), pp. 414–433.

33 See www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/public/Theme.aspx?themeNumber=136&themeName=Census%202011, accessed 25 June 2015. Around 10,000 according to the Belfast Islamic Centre, www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk/bic/about_us, accessed 10 January 2015.

34 “What does the Census tell us about religion in 2011?”.

35 www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_290558.pdf, accessed 10 May 2015.

36 “What does the Census tell us about religion in 2011?”.

Muslim Population	<p>England and Wales: 2.7 million (4.8% of population in 2011).</p> <p>Scotland: 77,000 Muslims (1.4% of population in 2011).</p> <p>Northern Ireland: 3,832 (0.2% of population in 2011).</p>
Ethnic/National Backgrounds	<p>Largest ethnic/national groups in England and Wales:³⁷</p> <p>White total: 8%.</p> <p>Mixed ethnic group: 4%</p> <p>Asian/Asian British: 68% (includes Pakistani 38%, Bangladeshi 15% and Indian 7%)</p> <p>Black/African/Caribbean/Black British: 10%</p> <p>Other: 11% (includes new category for Arabs at 7%)</p>
Inner-Islamic Groups	<p>Inner-Islamic groups: No official data available, but a crude ratio could be gained through mosque statistics. In 2014,³⁸ roughly 4.1% of mosques in Britain were Shi'i.³⁹</p>
Geographical Spread	<p>12.4% of London's population is Muslim, an increase of 3.9% from the 2001 census. Elsewhere in the country, Blackburn has a 27% Muslim population and Bradford, Luton, Slough and Birmingham have over 20% Muslim population each.</p>
Number of Mosques	<p>1,740 is the rough estimate of mosques as of 2014.⁴⁰</p>

37 Excel data on ethnicity is available to download from the Office of National Statistics www.ons.gov.uk, accessed 10 January 2015.

38 Mosques statistics are unreliable because no systematic and rigorous count has been made.

39 www.muslimsinbritain.org/resources/masjid_report.pdf, accessed 10 January 2015.

40 www.muslimsinbritain.org/resources/masjid_report.pdf, accessed 10 January 2015.

- Muslim Burial Sites**
- Garden of Peace, Elmbridge Road, Hainault, Ilford IG6 3SW.
 - City of London, City of London Cemetery, Aldersbrook Road, London, E12 5DQ
 - Bury Cemetery, St Peter's Road, Bury.
 - Brookwood Cemetery, Glades House, Cemetery Pales, Brookwood, Woking, Surrey GU24 0BL.
 - North Watford Cemetery, North Western Avenue, Watford, WD25 0AW.
- Places of Islamic Learning and Education**
- For details of Muslim schools and madrasas in the UK, see the Association of Muslim Schools website: <http://ams-uk.org/>.
- Cambridge Muslim College (14 St. Paul's Road, Cambridge, CB1 2EZ, 01223 355 235, www.cambridgemuslimcollege.org).
 - Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (George Street, Oxford OX1 2AR, <http://www.oxcis.ac.uk/>).
 - The Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE) (The Islamic Foundation, Markfield Conference Centre, Ratby Lane, Markfield, Leicestershire, LE67 9SY). The first academic institution for the study of Islam in an Islamic institution within the context of higher education in the UK. <http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/User/Home.aspx>.
- Muslim Media and Publications**
- The Muslim News (PO Box 380, Harrow, Middlesex HA2 6LL, United Kingdom, <http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/>).
 - British Muslim TV (<http://www.britishmuslim.tv/>).
 - Islam Channel (14 Bonhill Street, London, United Kingdom, EC2A 4BX, <http://www.islamchannel.tv/>).
 - The Muslim Weekly (Suite 8, Montefiore Centre, Hanbury Street, London E1 5HZ, <http://www.the-muslimweekly.com/>).

Main Muslim Organisations

- The Muslim Council of Britain (PO Box 57330, London, E1 2WJ, tel.: ++44 8452626786, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/>). It is a non-sectarian body working for the common good. The Muslim Council of Britain is a national representative Muslim umbrella body with over 500 affiliated national, regional and local organisations, mosques, charities and schools.
- Muslim Youth Helpline (MYH FREEPOST RTRZ-RXTY-AUZR, tel.: ++44 2074358171, <http://www.myh.org.uk/>).
- Radical Middle Way (<http://www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk/>). Founded in the wake of the 7/7 attacks, it promotes a mainstream, moderate understanding of Islam that young people can relate to. Radical Middle Way is a safe place for people to ask difficult questions and explore challenging issues.
- The New Muslims Project, The Islamic Foundation (Ratby Lane, Markfield, Leicestershire, LE67 9SY, tel.: ++44 1530243937, www.newmuslimsproject.net). A network for new Muslims.
- Al-Khoei Foundation (Stone Hall, Chevening Road, London, NW6 6TN, tel.: ++44 2073724049, ++44 2073720694). One of the largest international Shi'i Muslim organisations. It operates numerous schools, colleges, universities, Islamic and community centres around the world.
- Faith Matters (Fourth Floor, Hamilton House, Mabledon Place, Bloomsbury, London, WC1H 9BB, tel.: ++44 8000280826, www.faith-matters.org).
- Muslim Council of Wales (Broadway House, Broadway, Cardiff, CF24 1PU, tel.: ++44 2920487667, <http://www.muslimcouncilwales.org.uk/muslimcouncil/>). A broad-based umbrella organisation for Muslim and Islamic organisations in Wales.
- Islamic Relief UK (16 Lower Marsh, London SE1 7RJ, tel.: ++44 2075933232, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/>). Charity organisation.
- Human Appeal (Victoria Court, 376 Wilmslow Road, Manchester. <https://humanappeal.org.uk>). Charity organisation.
- UK Islamic Mission (UKIM, <http://www.ukim.org/contactus/>). The UK Islamic Mission is a national organisation with over 45 branches and Islamic centres working across the United Kingdom. The UK Islamic Mission formed in 1962. The activities, which the UKIM is involved in, are diverse, from building new mosques, relief work, to *da'wa* and youth work.
- CAGE (27 Old Gloucester Street, London, WC1N 3XX, <http://www.cageuk.org>). An independent advocacy organisation working to empower communities impacted by the so-called War on Terror.
- Islamic Society of Britain (26 York Street, London, W1U 6PZ, tel.: ++44 3003651098, <http://www.isb.org.uk>). The Islamic Society of Britain is a

community based charity and non-profit company. Established in 1990, it has a British Muslim identity and aims to promote greater understanding and awareness of Islam, to organise, educate and enhance the development of British Muslim communities, to encourage positive contribution to British society and the promotion of social justice

- Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) (38 Mapesbury Road, London, NW2 4JD, tel.: ++44 2084524493, www.fosis.org.uk). Established in 1963, FOSIS is a body that caters for the needs of Muslim students in further and higher education across the UK and Ireland.
- Muslim Association of Britain (124 Harrowdene Road, Wembley, Middlesex HA0 2JF, +44 2089089109, <http://www.mabonline.net/>).